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A Note on Bush and Clinton* 
James M. McCormick, Iowa State University 
Eugene R. Wittkopf, Louisiana State University 
David M. Danna, Louisiana State University 
This research extends an earlier study of the bipartisan and political 
perspectives for evaluating congressional-executive relations on foreign 
policy to cover the Bush administration and the first Clinton term. As 
expected, the end of the Cold War accelerated the decline of bi-
partisanship and accentuated the continuing relevance of the political 
perspective. The level of bipartisan accord was relatively low during 
both administrations, particularly compared with other administra-
tions since 1947. Ideological and partisan divisions occurred during 
both presidencies, with the former more pronounced under Bush and 
the latter under Clinton. Whether control of the presidency and Con-
gress was divided or unified also bears on our findings, as each eroded 
bipartisanship in different ways. Divided government undermined 
bipartisanship by heightening ideological differences, while unified 
government contributed to its erosion by fostering partisan divisions. 
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In earlier research, we outlined two competing perspectives for evaluat-
ing congressional-executive relations on foreign policy. 1 According to the 
bipartisan perspective, congressional-executive relations would be rela-
tively harmonious: policymaking would generally be the product of 
cooperation and accord between Congress and the president and would 
exhibit a high degree of agreement, largely consistent with the president's 
wishes. According to the political perspective, relations between the 
legislative and executive branches would be relatively conflictual: foreign 
policy would be subject to partisan and ideological divisions, and the 
outcome less often consistent with the president's wishes. From the 
former perspective, politics stops at the water's edge; from the latter, it 
does not. 
Our analysis of congressional foreign policy voting from 194 7 through 
1988 revealed that the political perspective generally applied throughout 
the period, while the bipartisan perspective was applicable principally 
during the first two decades following World War II. We also found that 
the Vietnam conflict-widely believed to have exacerbated political divi-
sions on foreign policy-did somewhat reduce the degree of bipartisan-
ship but was not "a watershed in postwar American bipartisanship. " 2 In 
combination with other changes at home, particularly within the Con-
gress itself, Vietnam did, however, contribute to a further shift from 
bipartisanship to partisan and ideological divisions on foreign policy, 
which persisted into the 1980s. 3 
This note extends our earlier research to include the Bush and Clinton 
administrations, asking whether congressional-executive bipartisanship 
has continued to decline and partisan and ideological rancor to increase 
with the end of the Cold War. We also ask whether the (apparently tem-
porary) end of divided government in 1993-1994 raises new questions 
about the applicability of these competing models. 
I. After the Cold War: 
Increased Partisan and Ideological Rancor? 
For several complementary reasons we expect even greater support for 
the political perspective during the Bush and Clinton administrations. 
1. James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and 
Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988," Journal of 
Politics, 52 (1990): 1077-1100. 
2. McCormick and Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology," p. 1097. 
3. Cf. James Meernik, "Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on 
Foreign and Defense Policy," Journal of Politics, 55 (1993): 569-87. 
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First, the end of the Cold War removed the ready guide for responding to 
events that had promoted bipartisanship, affording members of Con-
gress and presidents alike a wider latitude in considering foreign policy 
options, including a more careful consideration of their domestic ramifi-
cations. Second, the Cold War's end meant that issues other than the 
previously dominant security matters now crowded the agenda. These 
issues-including economics, the environment, and social-cultural con-
cerns-rarely lend themselves to a unified domestic position. Even the 
security issues that remain on the agenda (e.g., the dangers posed by the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction or the emergence of ethnopoliti-
cal conflicts) do not easily evoke a common domestic response when 
compared with the Cold War era. Third, domestic political changes have 
reinforced partisan and ideological differences on foreign policy. Con-
servative Republicans are replacing conservative Democrats in the South, 
some Democrats have switched parties to enjoy a closer alignment 
between their political preferences and party affiliation, and moderates 
in both parties are seemingly fewer in number, as contentious issues 
increasingly polarize the parties. Without the cross-pressures between 
ideology and party operating on some members of Congress and without 
accommodative members in the middle, the prospect for bipartisanship 
diminishes. 4 
Interactions between periods of divided and unified government with 
the end of the Cold War confound efforts to determine the impact of the 
Cold War's demise on partisan and ideological rancor. Thus, we are 
encouraged to ask whether differences in party control of Congress and 
the presidency, rather than changes in the international environment, 
affect recent developments in congressional foreign policy voting. The 
Bush and first Clinton administrations encompass three distinct periods 
of governance: (1) From 1989 through 1992, a Republican president 
faced a Democratic Congress (divided government and the demise of the 
4. For further discussion and analysis of the impact of the end of the Cold War, see, for 
example, James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Foreign Policy: Avenues of Influence," in 
The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 191-207, esp. pp. 205--06; Jeremy D. Rosner, The New 
Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security (Washington, DC: 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); Edward A. Kolodziej, "Foreign 
and Security Dimensions of the New World Order: A Challenge to American Policy," in 
Post-Cold War Policy: The International Context, ed. William Crotty (Chicago: Nelson-
Hall Publishers, 1995), pp. 113-30; Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social 
Work," Foreign Affairs, 75 (1996): 16-32; and Stanley Hoffmann, "In Defense of Mother 
Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 75 (1996): 172-75. 
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Cold War); 5 (2) from 1993 through 1994, a Democratic president faced a 
Democratic Congress (unified government and the onset of the post-
Cold War era); and (3) from 1995 through 1996, a Democratic president 
faced a Republican Congress (a return to divided government during the 
post-Cold War era). 
Although considerable literature exists on the domestic policy effects 
of divided government, little or no work specifically evaluates its impact 
on congressional foreign policy voting. Nonetheless, we can identify 
some general propositions and seek to extend them to foreign policy 
voting. David Mayhew contends that whether the government was 
divided or unified did not make much difference in foreign policy 
behavior during the Cold War. 6 Extending this view to foreign policy 
voting, then, the interinstitutional arrangements of governance would 
likely have no effect. Morris Fiorina, however, concludes differently; in 
his view divided government will likely lead to more partisan conflict in 
Congress. Drawing upon roll call analyses by Sean Kelly, Fiorina sug-
gests that "policy agreement between the president and congressional 
majorities is more than 20 percent lower when the institutions are con-
trolled by different parties," and explains this by arguing that "under 
divided government, congressional majorities are loath to do anything 
that would enhance the president's standing. " 7 Gary Cox and Samuel 
Kernell, too, contend that divided government has some effect, albeit a 
limited one. Based on their statistical analyses of congressional voting 
from 1933 through 1988, they conclude that divided government affects 
party cohesion: "House Republicans have been significantly less 
cohesive when their man is in the White House," while House Democrats 
''do not experience a significant decline in cohesion when there is a Dem-
ocratic president. " 8 Since the insights of Mayhew, Fiorina, and Cox and 
Kernell have not been directly tested for congressional foreign policy 
voting, we have an opportunity to probe these arguments for the differ-
ing periods of unified and divided government during the Bush and 
Clinton administrations. 
5. Rosner, The New Tug-of-War, p. 6, views the years from 1989 through 1991 as "a 
transitional period" with the post-Cold War era beginning in January, 1992. 
6. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investiga-
tions, 1946-1990 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 195-96. 
Mayhew reached this same conclusion for all policy areas, not just foreign affairs (p. 198). 
For a similar conclusion on the impact of divided government, see Charles 0. Jones, The 
Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994). 
7. Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), 
pp. 166-67. 
8. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., in the "Conclusions" of their The Politics 
of Divided Government (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 244-45. 
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II. Methods and Findings 
We measure bipartisanship in two ways: (1) as the percentage of foreign-
policy votes on which a majority of Democrats and Republicans agree 
with the president's position (Congress Index); and (2) as the percentage 
of agreement for each member of the House and Senate with the presi-
dent's position across all foreign-policy issues in a given session of a 
Congress (Member Index). The Member Index (MI) differs from the 
Congress Index (CI) in that the unit of analysis in the former is the indi-
vidual member of Congress and in the latter, Congress as a whole. These 
two measures of bipartisanship enable us to tap different aspects of con-
gressional-executive relations; the MI, in particular, allows us to assess 
the impact of partisanship and ideology on foreign policy voting. 9 
As in our earlier work on bipartisanship, we examine all foreign policy 
votes in the Congress to assess this phenomenon. Thus, we give equal 
weight to all votes and do not attempt to assess the relative importance of 
some votes over others. We believe this is appropriate because we are 
interested in assessing the whole range of bipartisanship and not just 
some components of it (e.g., conflictual votes only).1° We included all 
votes on foreign-policy issues in the House and Senate on which the 
president took a position. The presidents' positions are those reported in 
relevant issues of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report or Congres-
sional Quarterly Almanac. Foreign-policy issues were broadly defined to 
include relations with other nations, national security, foreign aid, trade, 
and immigration. Both authorization and appropriation votes were 
included. The voting data are from the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) for 1989-1990, and the Congres-
9. We recognize that our methodology cannot capture the entire scope of congressional-
executive interactions on foreign policy. On occasion, the state of these relations may 
instead be best captured by what is not taken up by Congress (e.g., the refusal to consider 
ambassadorial appointments or arms control treaties) or when the president refuses to pre-
sent an issue to Congress (e.g., the use of troops in Haiti). Other methodologies would be 
needed to capture these dimensions. For doubts about the utility of relying solely on roll-
call votes for evaluating congressional-executive relations, see James M. Lindsay and 
Wayne P. Steger, "The 'Two Presidencies' in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call 
Analysis," Congress& the Presidency, 20 (1993): 103-17. For a contrary viewpoint, see Jon 
R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 66-71. 
10. One may also confine attention to different issue-areas. In James M. McCormick 
and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "At the Water's Edge: The Effects of Party, Ideology, and Issues 
on Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, 1947-1988," American Politics Quarterly, 20 
(1992): 26-53, we found that there is comparatively little difference across dimensions of 
issue-voting. 
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siona/ Quarterly Almanac, and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 
for the other years. (Neither the ICPSR nor the other sources bears any 
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations reported here, but we 
are grateful to each one for these data.) 
Partisanship is simply whether a member of Congress is a Republican 
or a Democrat. Third-party members are excluded from the analysis, 
since there was only one member of the House (Bernard Sanders) listed 
as an Independent. We determined a member's ideology by grouping 
each member of Congress into one of three categories-conservative, 
moderate, or liberal-on the basis of his or her voting record as rated by 
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). We categorized members 
in relation to the mean ADA score of each chamber during each Con-
gress. Members having ADA scores more than half a standard deviation 
below the mean are defined as conservatives, members having ADA 
scores equal to or within half a standard deviation above or below the 
mean are defined as moderates, and members having ADA scores more 
than half a standard deviation above the mean are liberals. While there is 
a slight overlap in our foreign policy dataset with the votes used to cal-
culate members' ratings, our extensive recalculation of ADA scores for 
the 1947-1988 period reveals that the overlaps did not affect the pattern 
of findings. 11 
A Continuing Bipartisan Decline? 
Figure 1 shows the CI measure of bipartisanship for the Bush administra-
tion and the first Clinton term. (Tables Al-A3 in the Appendix portray 
the data for the figures as well as the Congress-by-Congress results for 
the two administrations.) Bush gained bipartisan support on 19 percent 
11. For details on this recalculation of ADA scores, see McCormick and Wittkopf, 
"Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology," pp. 1083, 1094, and 1097. Though relying 
on ADA scores to measure ideology has been criticized, other studies have found that alter-
nate measures are highly correlated with this one. See, for example, the discussion in 
Robert A. Bernstein, Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), pp. 17-18, 65-66, 70-71, or his earlier 
analysis: Robert A. Bernstein and Stephen R. Horn, "Explaining House Voting on Energy 
Policy: Ideology and the Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic Interests," 
Western Political Quarterly, 34 (1981): 240. Also see the analysis by Eric R. A. N. Smith, 
Richard Herrera, and Cheryl L. Herrera, "The Measurement Characteristics of Congres-
sional Roll-Call Indexes," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15 (1990): 283-95, which examines 
the reliability and validity of indices of ideology. Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 
"Patterns of Congressional Voting," American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991): 
228-78, also reveal the partisan and ideological dimensions underlying congressional voting 
patterns. 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.219 on Mon, 16 Mar 2020 17:40:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Research Note 139 
Figure 1. Bipartisan Foreign-Policy Voting in the House and 
Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations, 1989-96 
Percent 
35 
Bush administration Clinton administration 
~House llll1ill Senate 
of the foreign policy votes in the House and 29 percent in the Senate, 
while Clinton enjoyed bipartisan support on 27 percent in the House and 
32 percent in the Senate. The scores for both administrations are sub-
stantially lower than for the presidencies of Truman through Nixon, 
when the average level of bipartisanship was over 40 percent in the House 
and usually at least 50 to 60 percent in the Senate. Further, Bush's bipar-
tisan support in both chambers was lower than that of the other post-
Vietnam administrations (Ford, Carter, and Reagan). In contrast, 
Clinton's bipartisan support in the House was slightly higher than that of 
Ford, Carter, and Reagan, but his bipartisan support in the Senate was 
lower than these three administrations. The CI index thus supports the 
contention that the bipartisan perspective has continued to recede with 
the Cold War's demise. 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.219 on Mon, 16 Mar 2020 17:40:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
140 Research Note 
















Figure 2 portrays the MI for the president's party and the opposition 
party in the House and the Senate. The data generally reveal wider par-
tisan differences than prevailed during the Cold War. For the Bush 
administration, differences between Republicans and Democrats in both 
chambers were nearly identical, at 34 percent and 35 percent, consider-
ably larger than the average (20 percent) we found across all administra-
tions from 1947 to 1988. 12 Still, the gaps for Bush are generally consistent 
with the partisan differences evident in the Reagan administration. For 
the Clinton administration, the partisan gap is slightly narrower in the 
House (22 percent) than in the Senate (34 percent). The latter gap is thus 
generally in line with the Bush results, but the former is closer to the 
12. McCormick and Wittkopf. "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology," p. 1089. 
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Figure 3. Partisanship and Ideology in the House and Senate, 
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average gap across the Truman through Reagan administrations. 13 On 
balance, these results suggest that partisan loyalties have remained intact 
as we have entered the post-Cold War era, ensuring that partisan divi-
sions remain wide as well. 
Waning Ideological Divisions? 
Figure 3 shows the ideological breakdown on the Member Index for con-
servatives, moderates, and liberals, controlling for the president's party 
13. These gaps remain about the same for each of the two Bush Congresses, although the 
I 02nd Senate has a partisan gap of 41 percent. For the two Clinton Congresses, the gaps are 
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and the opposition party. What is striking is how much ideology matters 
in accounting for foreign policy voting patterns during the Bush admin-
istration, but how little it explains in Clinton's. 
Bush received most of his support from conservatives, less support 
from moderates, and the least support from liberals across both parties 
and in both chambers, ideological patterns consistent with the Cold War 
years. The Clinton administration displays ideological patterns only in 
the Senate. Conservatives, moderates, and liberals among House Demo-
crats provided roughly equal levels of support. Among Republicans, 
conservatives and moderates provided roughly the same levels of sup-
port, but those levels were lower (by more than 20 percent) than among 
Democrats with similar ideological labels. (No liberal Republicans were 
identified by our coding method.) In the Senate, the patterns of ideo-
logical support and opposition are more identifiable. Liberals in both 
parties provide the most support and conservatives the least. The effects 
of party can be detected in that the magnitude of difference between the 
comparable ideological groups in each party ranges from 7 percent 
among liberals to 31 percent among conservatives (see Table A-3). Thus, 
the ideological disposition of the Republican members of Congress 
affected their foreign policy voting during the Clinton administration, 
but ideological differences among Democrats did not alter their com-
paratively sustained foreign policy support. 
The Relative Impact of Party and Ideology 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques enable us to complete a more 
thorough-going test of the political perspective. 14 Using the Member 
Index as the dependent variable and party and ideology as predictors, we 
find that, with one exception, both explanatory variables are statistically 
significant (see Table I). The House during the Clinton administration is 
the exception, as ideology is not significant. The explanatory power of 
the two predictors is substantial, with 73 to 81 percent of the variance 
wider in the 104th Congress (36 and 39 in the House and Senate, respectively), but narrower 
in the 103rd Congress (8 and 28, respectively). 
14. Since the intercorrelations between partisanship and ideology (using the ADA 
scores, not the three-part classifications) for both administrations are quite high (.8 or 
better), we ran regressions to determine the separate impact of party and ideology. The 
results generally mirror those reported in the ANOVA with both predictors in the analysis. 
The separate ideology regressions explain more variance than the party regressions for the 
Bush administration. For the Clinton administration, the separate party regressions explain 
more variance than the separate ideology regressions in the House, but the two are nearly 
identical in the Senate (ideology R' = .72, party R' = .69). 
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accounted for in three of the four analyses (but only 37 percent in the 
other). 
The results in Table I reveal somewhat different patterns in the two 
administrations. During the Bush administration, party and ideology are 
statistically significant in both the House and the Senate, but the relative 
impact of ideology is greater (evidenced by the beta for ideology, which 
is more than twice as large as the party beta). These results also confirm 
Table I. Multivariate ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analyses 
of the Relationship Between Congressional Foreign-Policy 
Voting, Partisanship, and Ideology for the Bush 
and Carter Administrations 
HOUSE SENATE 
ADMINISTRATION/ MEAN MEAN 
SOURCE OF VARIATION N (BETA) N (BETA) 
Bush Administration 
Party (P) 
Republican 332 54 88 65 
Democrat 514 43 109 53 
(.25)" (.27) a 
Ideology (I) 
Conservative 326 64 75 74 
Moderate 184 48 47 61 
Liberal 336 31 75 42 
(. 70) a (.65) a 
P x I significant at: not sig. not sig. 
R-square: .81 .78 
Clinton Administration 
Party (P) 
Republican 402 42 94 48 
Democrat 446 64 102 69 
(.61)" (.49) a 
Ideology (I) 
Conservative 379 51 82 50 
Moderate 143 52 30 62 
Liberal 326 55 84 67 
(.02) (.40) a 
P x I significant at: not sig. sig. b 
R-square: .37 .73 
"Significant at the .01 level. 
bSignificant at the .05 level. 
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that conservatives provided Bush his most support and liberals his least. 
For the Clinton administration, the results are much different than 
would be expected from the historical record, with party affiliation prov-
ing to be more important than ideology. In the House the party variable 
is statistically significant, but ideology is not. Furthermore, other factors 
exogenous to our model also seem to be crucial, as only about a third of 
the variance is explained. In the Senate, both predictor variables are once 
again significant, but the relative impact of party is greater than ideol-
ogy, as indicated by the betas. While liberals and moderates gave Clinton 
more support than conservatives, party, not ideological disposition, 
remained the more potent variable. 
In sum, party and ideology remain key explanations of congressional 
foreign policy voting with the passing of the Cold War, providing con-
tinuing support for the political perspective. These results are consistent 
with the more general analysis of congressional-executive relations 
reported by Bond and Fleisher for the 1953-1984 period. Their findings 
"indicate that members of Congress provide levels of support for the 
president that are generally consistent with their partisan and ideological 
predispositions." 15 Hence, this "Congress-centered thesis" proves to be 
a better explanation than their "Presidency-centered" one, which 
focuses primarily on presidential leadership. By analogy, our political 
perspective, which emphasizes party and ideology, does much better than 
the bipartisan perspective, which emphasizes the importance of the presi-
dent in defining the agenda and shaping the debate. 
Partisanship, Ideology, and Divided Government 
This support for the political perspective says nothing about how divided 
and unified governments affected foreign policy voting during these 
transitional years. Expectations are quite mixed: Mayhew contends that 
the presence or absence of divided government did not seem to matter. 
Fiorina suggests that divided government should exacerbate conflict on 
congressional voting between the branches, while Cox and Kernell find 
that unified government will not necessarily result in party cohesion in 
congressional voting, especially among House Republicans. 
Our results point to greater conflict (less bipartisanship) during 
periods of divided government. During the Bush administration's period 
of divided government (Period 1 ), the CI in the House is about the same 
as the CI during the Clinton administration's period of divided govern-
15. Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, p. 223. 
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ment (Period 3), at 19 percent and 22 percent, respectively. For the two 
comparable periods in the Senate, the Bush administration's CI is 29 per-
cent versus the Clinton administration's 31 percent. If we were to confine 
the comparable period of the Bush administration to the 102nd Congress 
only-after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany 
-the results are even closer to the 104th Congress. It appears that 
divided government interacted with the end of the Cold War to lower the 
level of bipartisan accord, especially in the House. 
By contrast, during the Clinton period of unified government (1993-
1994), the Cis are higher in both chambers than during the periods of 
divided government. Yet, it is noteworthy that the levels are no higher 
than those for the Reagan administration, which faced a divided govern-
mental structure throughout its tenure. These findings suggest the end of 
the Cold War had an effect even in the face of unified government, by 
inviting greater partisan and ideological discord than might have other-
wise been expected. 
The argument about party cohesion and divided government is admit-
tedly more complex than we can test here. However, if we compare con-
gressional loyalty to the party's president across the periods analyzed 
with our ANOVA procedures, we can gain some insight into the impact 
of divided government on the foreign policy process. Our analyses show 
that divided government did not lead to more partisan voting, but, un-
expectedly, to more ideological voting. 16 Ideology proved to be a better 
predictor than party during the Bush administration, and ideology was 
more important in the House (but not the Senate) during the Clinton 
administration's experience with divided government (104th Congress). 
By contrast, unified government (103rd Congress) generated more par-
tisan voting in the House, while ideology remained prominent in the 
Senate. Overall, the results are consistent with what Cox and Kernell 
contend as applied to the House, but their argument appears not to 
extend to the Senate. 
16. Separate ANOVA analyses for the Congresses were computed within each admin-
istration. For both Congresses and chambers in the Bush administration, the betas for 
ideology were at least twice the size of the betas for party. For the Ointon administration, 
the picture is more mixed. The party beta (.58) is larger than the ideology beta (.46) in the 
103rd House, but the ideology beta (.59) is less than twice as large as the party beta (.35) in 
the 104th House. In the 103rd Senate, the ideology beta (.48) is larger than the party beta 
(.34), while in the 104th Senate, the party beta (.71) is about three times as large as the 
ideology beta (.24). 
Since the intercorrelations between partisanship and ideology for each chamber in the 
four Congresses were large, ranging from .78 in the lOlst House to .95 in the 104th Senate, 
we also ran separate regressions for party and ideology for each one, but they do not alter 
the interpretations based on the ANOVA analyses. 
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III. Conclusion 
Our analyses confirm that bipartisanship has continued to wane in the 
post-Cold War era and that the political perspective is an increasingly 
powerful interpretation of congressional-executive relations in foreign 
policymaking. The level of bipartisan accord between Congress and the 
president reached new lows during the Bush and the first Clinton presi-
dencies. In the Senate, the level of bipartisanship is lower for Bush and 
Clinton than for any president since 1947. In the House, bipartisanship 
rivals historical lows, with Bush experiencing a lower level than any other 
president's and Clinton's looking remarkably similar to the post-
Vietnam Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies. While bipartisan coop-
eration arguably provides a floor undergirding American foreign policy-
making, it apparently is a very low one-and has been for some time. 
By contrast, the political perspective remains the predominant inter-
pretation of foreign policy voting. Any change in the power of this per-
spective compared with the Cold War era is more one of degree than 
kind. The partisan gap on foreign policy votes remained very wide during 
the Bush and Clinton administrations. Ideological divisions also re-
mained pronounced on foreign policy votes, especially during the Bush 
administration. 
The presence or absence of divided government also matters. Divided 
government contributed to the decline in bipartisanship by accentuating 
the rise of ideological differences. Witness the strength of ideology in the 
two Congresses during the Bush administration and in the House during 
the 104th Congress of the Clinton administration. Unified government 
contributes to bipartisan decline in a different way, by fostering partisan 
divisions, especially as the experience of the Clinton administration in 
the House during the 103rd Congress reveals. 
Finally, our analysis underscores that the realignment of partisan 
loyalties in the House and the Senate has also contributed to the decline 
in bipartisanship. As the center of the political spectrum disappears and 
as partisanship and ideology among members become increasingly 
aligned with one another, we are witnessing a withering of the difference 
between these two concepts. The realignment of party politics, widely 
discussed by experts in American domestic politics, bears strongly on the 
erosion of the bipartisan perspective and the increased saliency of the 
political perspective. Realignment is encouraged further by the divisive-
ness of the new economic, environmental, and socio-cultural concerns of 
United States foreign policy and the continuing arguments over tradi-
tional national security issues and America's appropriate role in the 
world. These issues and debates only exacerbate partisan and ideological 
divisions, overwhelming the impulses for bipartisanship at the water's 
edge. 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.219 on Mon, 16 Mar 2020 17:40:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Research Note 147 
APPENDIX 
Table A-1. Bipartisan Foreign-Policy Voting in the House 
and Senate, Bush and Clinton Administrations 
IOlst 
I. Bush Administration Overall Congress 
House 18.7• 17.2 
Senate 28.9 28.4 
103rd 
II. Clinton Administration Overall Congress 
House 26.6 32.7 
Senate 32.l 33.3 









Table A-2. Partisan Gaps in the House and Senate on Foreign-Policy 
Voting, Bush and Clinton Administrations (in percent) 
Bush Administration, 1989-1992 
lOlst 102nd 
Overall Congress Congress 
House 
President's Party 67.8 70.7 64.8 
Opposition Party 34.l 34.9 33.3 
Senate 
President's Party 78.l 75.2 81.8 
Opposition Party 43.3 45.5 41.2 
Clinton Administration, 1993-1996 
I03rd 104th 
Overall Congress Congress 
House 
President's Party 63.9 60.9 67.7 
Opposition Party 41.7 53.4 32.0 
Senate 
President's Party 75.2 74.6 76.0 
Opposition Party 41.2 46.8 36.5 
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Table A-3. Partisanship and Ideology on Foreign-Policy Voting 
in the House and the Senate, Bush and Clinton 
Administrations (in percent) 
HOUSE 
Bush Administration, 1989-1992 
IOI st 102nd 
Overall Congress Congress 
President's Party 
Conservative 70.2 74.2 66.4 
Moderate 54.9 55.5 53.8 
Liberal 40.6 40.7 40.4 
Opposition Party 
Conservative 61.3 64.6 56.9 
Moderate 43.3 47.0 40.4 
Liberal 26.7 26.0 27.4 
Clinton Administration, 1993-1996 
103rd 104th 
Overall Congress Congress 
President's Party 
Conservative 65.1 69.3 44.1 
Moderate 64.3 67.6 55.3 
Liberal 63.7 57.1 70.2 
Opposition Party 
Conservative 41.6 55.1 30.8 
Moderate 42.9 46.5 41.0 
Liberal 
SENATE 
Bush Administration, 1989-1992 
IOI st 102nd 
Overall Congress Congress 
President's Party 
Conservative 80.7 77.0 84.8 
Moderate 67.5 70.9 63.6 
Liberal 50.0 50.0 
Opposition Party 
Conservative 67.I 60.8 79.6 
Moderate 56.3 59.9 52.6 
Liberal 36.7 37.7 35.9 
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TABLE A-3. (continued) 
SENATE 
Clinton Administration, 1993-1996 
103rd 104th 
Overall Congress Congress 
President's Party 
Conservative 69.4 58.3 75.0 
Moderate 71.3 72.0 69.0 
Liberal 76.2 75.7 76.8 
Opposition Party 
Conservative 38.7 43.4 35.2 
Moderate 52.0 57.1 46.0 
Liberal 69.4 69.4 
